Eine etwas ältere Rede, die allerdings nicht an Aktualität verloren hat :

Anatomy of a Crisis
April 09, 2010

Economic theory has modeled itself on theoretical physics. It has sought to establish timelessly valid laws that govern economic behavior and can be used reversibly both to explain and to predict events. But instead of finding laws capable of being falsified through testing, economics has increasingly turned itself into an axiomatic discipline consisting of assumptions and mathematical deductions – similar to Euclidean geometry.

Rational expectations theory and the efficient market hypothesis are products of this approach. Unfortunately they proved to be unsound. To be useful, the axioms must resemble reality. Euclid’s axioms met that condition; rational expectations theory doesn’t. It postulates that there is a correct view of the future to which the views of the participants tend to converge. But the correct view is correct only if it is universally adopted by all the participants -- an unlikely prospect. Indeed, if it is unrealistic to expect all participants to subscribe to the theory of rational expectations, it’s irrational for any participant to adopt it. Anyhow, rational expectations theory was pretty conclusively falsified by the crash of 2008 which caught most participants and most regulators unawares. The crash of 2008 also falsified the Efficient Market Hypothesis because it was generated by internal developments within the financial markets, not by external shocks, as the hypothesis postulates.

The failure of these theories brings the entire edifice of economic theory into question. Can economic phenomena be predicted by universally valid laws? I contend that they can’t be, because the phenomena studied have a fundamentally different structure from natural phenomena. The difference lies in the role of thinking. Economic phenomena have thinking participants, natural phenomena don’t. The thinking of the participants introduces an element of uncertainty that is absent in natural phenomena. The uncertainty arises because the participants’ thinking does not accurately represent reality.

In human affairs thinking serves two functions: a cognitive one and a causal one. The two functions interfere with each other: the independent variable of one function is the dependent variable of the other. And when the two functions operate simultaneously, neither function has a truly independent variable. I call this interference reflexivity.

Reflexivity introduces an element of uncertainty both into the participants’ understanding and into the situation in which they participate. It renders the situation unpredictable by timelessly valid laws. Such laws exist, of course, but they don’t determine the course of events.

Economic theory jumped through many hoops trying to eliminate this element of uncertainty. It started out with the assumption of perfect knowledge. But as Frank Knight showed in his book, “Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit” published in 1921, in conditions of perfect knowledge there would be no room for profits.

The assumption of perfect knowledge was replaced by the assumption of perfect information. When that proved insufficient to explain how financial markets anticipate the future, economists developed the theory of rational expectations. That is when economic theory parted company with reality. Some great thinkers, including Friedrich Hayek in his Nobel Prize speech, kept reminding economists of the importance of uncertainty but advances in quantitative modeling led to the neglect of this Knightian uncertainty. That is because quantitative methods cannot take into account uncertainty that cannot be quantified. Collateralized Debt Obligations and Credit Default Swaps and risk management methods produced by these quantitative approaches played a nefarious role in the crash of 2008.

The meltdown of the financial system in 2008 forces us to go back to the drawing board and look for a more realistic approach. I believe that we have to start with recognizing a fundamental difference between human and natural phenomena.

This means that financial markets should not be treated as a physics laboratory but as a form of history. The course of events is time-bound and one-directional. Predictions and explanations are not reversible. Some timelessly valid generalizations can serve to explain events but not to predict them.

I have started to develop a set of generalizations along these lines by introducing the concept of reflexivity. Reflexivity can be interpreted as a two-way feedback mechanism between the participants’ expectations and the actual course of events. The feedback may be positive or negative. Negative feedback serves to correct the participants’ misjudgments and misconceptions and brings their views closer to the actual state of affairs until, in an extreme case, they actually correspond to each other. In a positive feedback a distortion in the participants’ view causes mispricing in financial markets, which in turn affects the so-called fundamentals in a self-reinforcing fashion, driving the participants’ views and the actual state of affairs ever further apart. What renders the outcome uncertain is that a positive feedback cannot go on forever, yet the exact point at which it turns negative is inherently unpredictable. Such initially self-reinforcing but eventually self-defeating, boom-bust processes are just as characteristic of financial markets as the tendency towards equilibrium.

Instead of a universal and timeless tendency towards equilibrium, equilibrium turns out to be an extreme case of negative feedback. At the other extreme, positive feedback produces bubbles. Bubbles have two components: a trend that prevails in reality and a misconception relating to that trend. The trend that most commonly causes a bubble is the easy availability of credit and the most common misconception is that the availability of credit doesn’t affect the value of the collateral. Of course it does, as we have seen in the recent housing bubble. But that’s not sufficient to fully explain the course of events.

I have formulated a specific hypothesis for the crash of 2008 which holds that it was the result of a “super-bubble” that started forming in 1980 when Ronald Reagan became President of the United States and Margaret Thatcher was Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. The prevailing trend in the super-bubble was also the ever-increasing use of credit and leverage; but the misconception was different. It was the belief that markets correct their own excesses. Reagan called it the “magic of the marketplace”; I call it market fundamentalism. Since it was a misconception, it gave rise to bubbles. So the super-bubble was composed of a number of smaller bubbles -- and punctuated by a series of financial crises. Each time the authorities intervened and saved the system by taking care of the failing institutions and injecting more credit when necessary. So the smaller bubbles served as successful tests of a false belief, helping the super-bubble to grow bigger by reinforcing both credit creation and market fundamentalism.

It should be emphasized that this hypothesis was not sufficient to predict the outcome of individual crises. For instance, I predicted that the emerging market crisis of 1997 would lead to a collapse of global capitalism and I was wrong. Nor is it sufficient to fully explain actual outcomes. For that, one needs to take into account the specific historical circumstances. The hypothesis only helps to select the relevant circumstances.

Let me illustrate this by examining the origins of the super-bubble. For this, I need to go back beyond 1980 at least to the early 1970s.

At the end of World War II when I entered the financial markets, banks and financial markets were strictly regulated and international movements of financial capital were practically at a standstill. The restrictions were relaxed gradually, but at a glacial pace. As late as the beginning of the 1970s, the American banking system was still frozen into immobility. The industry was highly fragmented and regimented. A dull business attracted dull people who were more concerned with job security than with profits. Bank shares were traded by appointment. But I detected some signs of life. Walter Wriston at Citibank trained a new breed of profit oriented bankers who fanned out from Citibank to other banks.

Then in 1972, Citibank held a dinner meeting for security analysts – an unheard of event. I was not invited but it prompted me to publish a report entitled “The Case for Growth Banks” in which I argued that some banks were poised to embark on balanced growth by equity leveraging, i.e.: selling shares at a premium. The bouquet of bank shares I recommended did, in fact, rise by some 50% within a year.

Then came the first oil shock of 1973. The stock market tanked, ruling out equity leveraging. At the same time the recycling of petrodollars was left to the money center banks. They formed holding companies and established subsidiaries in London to escape the restrictions of the Glass-Steagall Act. That was the beginning of the eurodollar markets and of large-scale lending to emerging economies. It soon turned into a boom. Countries like Brazil experienced rapid growth, fuelled by foreign credit. The misconception in the lending boom was that the debt ratios which measured the credit-worthiness of the borrowing countries were independent of the flow of credit. The relationship was, of course, reflexive.

Then came the second oil shock in 1979 and the determined effort of the Federal Reserve under Paul Volcker to bring inflation under control. The Fed fund rate shot up into the high teens and the boom turned into a bust. In 1982 Mexico threatened to default. This was the onset of the first major financial crisis the response to which fuelled the growth of a super-bubble.

The international banking system would have collapsed if the authorities had not banded together to save it. They established what I called the “collective system of lending”. The central banks ordered the banks under their control to roll over their loans and the international financial authorities extended enough additional credit to the heavily indebted countries to enable them to remain current on interest payments and redemptions. The IMF imposed harsh conditions on the debtor countries while the regulatory restrictions on the banks were actually relaxed in order to allow them to earn their way out of a hole. After several years, when the banks built up sufficient reserves, the debtor countries were encouraged to reorganize their debts by issuing so called Brady bonds and the banks had to take some losses. The net result was a lost decade for Latin America but a big boost to the international banking system. Financial markets were deregulated and globalized. This stood in stark contrast with earlier financial crises of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries when each time a crisis occurred, regulations were tightened in order to prevent a recurrence. That is how central banking and market regulations had developed and became an integral part of the financial system.

What set this occasion apart from previous ones? Undoubtedly it was the market fundamentalist belief that markets are self-correcting, and best left to their own devices. But the need of the banks to earn their way out of a hole also played a part. This was the specific historical context in which the super-bubble developed.

The system that emerged was called the Washington Consensus. It was characterized by what was called “moral hazard,” but was actually an asymmetry between center and periphery. The countries at the periphery of the system were subject to harsh market discipline; but when the system itself was endangered, all bets were off. This gave the banks at the center a competitive advantage and they gradually came to dominate the global financial system.

The globalization spread like a virus. Since financial capital is an essential ingredient of production, once the U.S and the United Kingdom embraced market fundamentalist principles, other countries could not resist them. The financial sector of the U.S. and U.K. grew like Topsy, accounting for more than a third of corporate profits towards the end of the super-bubble in 2006.

In the absence of systemic reforms, the international banking crisis of 1982 repeated itself fifteen years later with only minor variations. Because banks had learned a lesson from 1982. The collective system of lending taught them that it is better to securitize loans and sell them to others than to keep them on their books because that way the central bank could not compel them to roll over loans that have gone sour. By the time the next emerging markets crisis struck in 1997, most of the loans had been securitized, greatly complicating the task of the international authorities. As a result, there was no collective system of lending except in the case of South Korea and there were no Brady bonds. The periphery countries had to bear an even larger share of the losses than in 1982.

Deregulation allowed financial innovators to introduce new forms of synthetic securities at will. Securitization was further encouraged by the misguided rule in Basel II which allowed banks to hold securities on their balance sheets without any reserve requirements because the securities were readily saleable. This may be true for individual banks but not for the banking system as a whole, as the LTCM crisis in 1998 demonstrated. Since the synthetic securities were designed on the basis of false principles, they played a major role in the crash of 2008. But I shall leave the examination of what happened in 2008 to the other speakers.

The point I am trying to make is that developments in the financial markets cannot be understood without considering them in a historical context. Financial markets have changed out of all recognition during my lifetime. Things that would have been inconceivable 50 years ago have become commonplace. Conversely, it seems inconceivable today that the economy could function without derivatives and other complicated instruments. Yet some of these instruments have had a destabilizing effect this is not properly understood. We really have to rethink our view of the financial markets quite profoundly; recognizing that instead of perfect knowledge and perfect information our understanding is inherently imperfect and that applies to market participants and regulators and social scientists alike.

But what is imperfect can be improved, and right now there is plenty of room for improvement – both in rethinking economics and rethinking regulations. I am afraid the current discussions miss the main point: namely that the recent financial crisis was not only a market failure but also a regulatory failure. And what matters now is not so much who regulates, but how. Regulators ought to undertake a course of critical self-examination – Chinese style. But that will be the subject of another panel.

Thank you.
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Anbei das Redeskript :

George Soros speech at Humboldt University
June 23, 2010

Giving a speech in Berlin, I feel obliged to speak about the euro because the euro is in crisis and Germany is the main protagonist. Unfortunately I didn’t get the timing right because the crisis has both a fiscal component and a banking component and the situation of the banks is just now approaching a climax. A comprehensive analysis will have to await the publication of stress test results. The best I can do at this moment is to put matters into a historical perspective.

I believe that misconceptions play a large role in shaping history and the euro crisis is a case in point.

Let me start my analysis with the previous crisis, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. In the week following September 15, 2008 global financial markets actually broke down and by the end of the week they had to be put on artificial life support. The life support consisted of substituting sovereign credit for the credit of financial institutions which ceased to be acceptable to counterparties.

As Mervyn King of the Bank of England explained, the authorities had to do in the short-term the exact opposite of what was needed in the long-term: they had to pump in a lot of credit, to replace the credit that had disappeared, and thereby reinforce the excess credit and leverage that had caused the crisis in the first place. Only in the longer term, when the crisis had subsided, could they drain the credit and reestablish macro-economic balance.

This required a delicate two phase maneuver – just as when a car is skidding, first you have to turn the car into the direction of the skid and only when you have regained control can you correct course.

The first phase of the maneuver has been successfully accomplished – a collapse has been averted. But the underlying causes have not been removed and they have surfaced again when the financial markets started questioning the credibility of sovereign debt. That is when the euro took center stage because of a structural weakness in its constitution. But we are dealing with a worldwide phenomenon, so the current situation is the direct consequence of the crash of 2008.

The situation is eerily reminiscent of the 1930s. Doubts about sovereign credit are forcing reductions in budget deficits at a time when the banking system and the economy may not be strong enough to do without fiscal and monetary stimulus. Keynes taught us that budget deficits are essential for counter-cyclical policies, yet governments everywhere feel compelled to reduce them under pressure from the financial markets. Coming at a time when the Chinese authorities have also put on the brakes, this is liable to push the global economy into a slowdown or possibly a double dip. Europe, which weathered the first phase of the financial crisis relatively well, is now in the forefront of the downward pressure because of the problems connected with the common currency.

The euro was an incomplete currency to start with. The Maastricht Treaty established a monetary union without a political union. The euro boasted a common central bank but it lacked a common treasury. It is exactly that sovereign backing that financial markets started questioning that was missing from the design. That is why the euro has become the focal point of the current crisis.

Member countries share a common currency, but when it comes to sovereign credit they are on their own. This fact was obscured until recently by the willingness of the European Central Bank to accept the sovereign debt of all member countries on equal terms at its discount window. This allowed the member countries to borrow at practically the same interest rate as Germany and the banks were happy to earn a few extra pennies on supposedly risk-free assets by loading up their balance sheets with the government debt of the weaker countries. These positions now endanger the creditworthiness of the European banking system. For instance, European banks hold nearly a trillion euros of Spanish debt of which half is held by German and French banks. It can be seen that the euro crisis is intricately interconnected with the situation of the banks.

How did this connection arise?

The introduction of the euro brought about a radical narrowing of interest rate differentials. This in turn generated real estate bubbles in countries like Spain, Greece, and Ireland. Instead of the convergence prescribed by the Maastricht Treaty, these countries grew faster and developed trade deficits within the eurozone, while Germany reigned in its labor costs, became more competitive and developed a chronic trade surplus. To make matters worse some of these countries, most notably Greece, ran budget deficits that exceeded the limits set by the Maastricht Treaty. But the discount facility of the ECB allowed them to continue borrowing at practically the same rates as Germany, relieving them of any pressure to correct their excesses.

The first clear reminder that the euro does not have a common treasury came after the bankruptcy of Lehman. The finance ministers of the European Union promised that no other financial institution whose failure could endanger the system would be allowed to default. But Angela Merkel opposed a joint Europe-wide guarantee; each country had to take care of its own banks.

At first, the financial markets were so impressed by the guarantee that they hardly noticed the difference. Capital fled from the countries which were not in a position to offer similar guarantees, but the interest differentials within the eurozone remained minimal. That was when the countries of Eastern Europe, notably Hungary and the Baltic States, got into difficulties and had to be rescued.

It was only this year that financial markets started to worry about the accumulation of sovereign debt within the eurozone. Greece became the center of attention when the newly elected government revealed that the previous government had lied and the deficit for 2009 was much larger than indicated.

Interest rate differentials started to widen but the European authorities were slow to react because the member countries held radically different views. Germany, which had been traumatized by two episodes of runaway inflation, was allergic to any buildup of inflationary pressures; France and other countries were more willing to show their solidarity. Since Germany was heading for elections, it was unwilling to act. But nothing could be done without Germany. So the Greek crisis festered and spread. When the authorities finally got their act together they had to offer a much larger rescue package than would have been necessary if they had acted earlier.

In the meantime, the crisis spread to the other deficit countries and, in order to reassure the markets, the authorities felt obliged to put together a €750 billion European Financial Stabilization Fund, €500 billion from the member states and €250 billion from the IMF.

But the markets are not reassured, because the term sheet of the Fund was dictated by Germany. The Fund is guaranteed not jointly but only severally so that the weaker countries will in fact be guaranteeing a portion of their own debt. The Fund will be raised by selling bonds to the market and charging a fee on top. It is difficult to see how it will merit a triple A rating.

Even more troubling is the fact that Germany is not only insisting on strict fiscal discipline for weaker countries but is also reducing its own fiscal deficit. When all countries are reducing deficits at a time of high unemployment they set in motion a downward spiral. Reductions in employment, tax receipts, and exports reinforce each other, ensuring that the targets will not be met and further reductions will be required. And even if budgetary targets were met, it is difficult to see how the weaker countries could regain their competitiveness and start growing again because, in the absence of exchange rate depreciation, the adjustment process would require reductions in wages and prices, producing deflation.

To some extent a continued decline in the value of the euro may mitigate the deflation but as long as there is no growth, the relative weight of the debt will continue to grow. This is true not only for the national debt but also for the commercial loans held by banks. This will make the banks even more reluctant to lend, compounding the downward pressures.

The euro is a patently flawed construct and its architects knew it at the time of its creation. They expected its defects to be corrected, if and when they became acute, by the same process that brought the European Union into existence.

The European Union was built by a process of piecemeal social engineering, indeed it is probably the most successful feat of social engineering in history. The architects recognized that perfection is unattainable. They set limited objectives and firm deadlines. They mobilized the political will for a small step forward, knowing full well that when it was accomplished its inadequacy would become apparent and require further steps. That is how the coal and steel community was gradually developed into the European Union, step by step.

Germany used to be at the heart of the process. German statesmen used to assert that Germany has no independent foreign policy, only a European policy. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Germany’s leaders realized that unification was possible only in the context of a united Europe and they were willing to make considerable sacrifices to secure European acceptance. When it came to bargaining they were willing to contribute a little more and take a little less than the others, thereby facilitating agreement. But those days are over. Germany doesn’t feel so rich anymore and doesn’t want to continue serving as the deep pocket for the rest of Europe. This change in attitudes is understandable but it did bring the process of integration to a screeching halt.

Germany now wants to treat the Maastricht Treaty as the scripture which has to be obeyed without any modifications and this is not understandable, because it is in conflict with the incremental method by which the European Union was built. Something has gone fundamentally wrong in Germany’s attitude towards the European Union.

Let me first analyze the structural defects of the euro and then examine Germany’s attitude. The biggest deficiency in the euro, the absence of a common fiscal policy, is well known. But there is another defect that has received less recognition: a false belief in the stability of financial markets. As I tried to explain in my writings, the Crash of 2008 has demonstrated that financial markets do not necessarily tend towards equilibrium; they are just as likely to produce bubbles. I don’t want to repeat my arguments here because you can find them in my lectures which have just been published in German. All I need to do is remind you that the introduction of the euro created its own bubble in the countries whose borrowing costs were greatly reduced. Greece abused the privilege by cheating, but Spain didn’t. It followed sound macro-economic policies, maintained its sovereign debt level below the European average, and exercised exemplary supervision over its banking system. Yet it enjoyed a tremendous real estate boom which has turned into a bust resulting in 20% unemployment. Now it has to rescue the savings banks called cajas and the municipalities. And the entire European banking system is weighed down by bad debts and needs to be recapitalized. The design of the euro did not take this possibility into account.

Another structural flaw in the euro is that it guards only against the danger of inflation and ignores the possibility of deflation. In this respect the task assigned to the ECB is asymmetric. This is due to Germany’s fear of inflation. When Germany agreed to substitute the euro for Deutschmark it insisted on strong safeguards to maintain the value of the currency. The Maastricht Treaty the contained a clause that expressly prohibited bailouts and the ban has been reaffirmed by the German Constitutional Court. It is this clause that has made the current situation so difficult to deal with.

And this brings me to the gravest defect in the euro’s design; it does not allow for error. It expects member states to abide by the Maastricht criteria without establishing an adequate enforcement mechanism. And now that several countries are far away from the Maastricht criteria, there is neither an adjustment mechanism nor an exit mechanism. Now these countries are expected to return to the Maastricht criteria even if such a move sets in motion a deflationary spiral. This is in direct conflict with the lessons learnt from the Great Depression of the 1930s and is liable to push Europe into a period of prolonged stagnation or worse. That will, in turn, generate discontent and social unrest. It is difficult to predict how the anger and frustration will express itself.

The wide range of possibilities will weigh heavily on the financial markets. They will have to discount the prospects of deflation and inflation, default and disintegration. Financial markets dislike uncertainty.

If that were to happen, Germany would have to bear a major share of the responsibility because as the strongest and most creditworthy country it calls the shots. By insisting on pro-cyclical policies, Germany is endangering the European Union. I realize that this is a grave accusation but I am afraid it is justified.

To be sure, Germany cannot be blamed for wanting a strong currency and a balanced budget but it can be blamed for imposing its predilection on other countries that have different needs and preferences – like Procrustes, who forced other people to lie in his bed and stretched them or cut off their legs to make them fit. The Procrustes bed inflicted on the eurozone is called deflation.

Unfortunately Germany does not realize what it is doing. It has no desire to impose its will on Europe; all it wants to do is to maintain its competitiveness and avoid becoming the deep pocket to the rest of Europe. But as the strongest and most creditworthy country it is in the driver’s seat. As a result Germany objectively determines the financial and macroeconomic policies of the Eurozone without being subjectively aware of it. When all the member countries try to be like Germany they are bound to send the eurozone into a deflationary spiral. That is the effect of the policy pursued by Germany and – since Germany is in the driver’s seat – these are the policies imposed on the eurozone.

The German public does not understand why it should be blamed for the troubles of eurozone. After all, it is the most successful economy in Europe, fully capable of competing in world markets. The troubles of the eurozone feel like a burden weighing Germany down. It is difficult to see what would change this perception because the troubles of the eurozone are depressing the euro and being the most competitive Germany benefits the most. As a result Germany is likely to feel the least pain of all the member states.

The error in the German attitude can best be brought home by engaging in a thought experiment. The most ardent instigators of that attitude would prefer that Germany leave the euro rather than modify its position. Let us consider where that would lead.

The Deutschmark would go thru the roof and the euro would fall thru the floor. This would indeed help the adjustment process but Germany would find out how painful it can be to have an overvalued currency. Its trade balance would turn negative and there would be widespread unemployment. German banks would suffer severe exchange rate losses and would require large injections of public funds. But it would be politically more acceptable to rescue German banks than Greece or Spain. And there would be other compensations: pensioners could retire to Spain and live like kings, helping Spanish real estate to recover.

Let me emphasized that this scenario is totally hypothetical because it is extremely unlikely that Germany would be allowed to leave the euro and to do so in a friendly manner. Germany’s exit would be destabilizing financially, economically and above all politically. The collapse of the single market would be difficult to avoid. The purpose of this thought experiment is to convince Germany to change its ways without going thru the actual experience that its current policies hold in store.

What would be the right policy for Germany to pursue? It cannot be expected to underwrite other countries’ deficits indefinitely. So some tightening of fiscal policies is inevitable. But some way has to be found to allow the countries in crisis to grow their way out of their difficulties. The countries concerned have to do most of the heavy lifting by introducing structural reforms but they do need some outside help to allow them to stimulate their economies. By cutting its budget deficit and resisting a rise in wages to compensate for the decline in the purchasing power of the euro Germany is actually making it more difficult for the other countries to regain competitiveness.

So what should Germany do? It needs to recognize three guiding principles.

First, the current crisis is more a banking crisis than a fiscal one. The continental European banking system has not been properly cleansed after the crash of 2008. Bad assets have not been marked-to-market but are being held to maturity. When markets started to doubt the creditworthiness of sovereign debt it was really the solvency of the banking system that was brought into question because the banks were loaded with the bonds of the weaker countries and these are now selling below par. The banks have difficulties in obtaining short-term financing. The interbank market and the commercial paper market have dried up and banks have turned to the ECB both for short-term financing and for depositing their excess cash. They are in no position to buy government bonds. That is the main reason why risk premiums on government bonds have widened, setting up a vicious circle.

The crisis has now culminated in forcing the authorities to disclose the results of their stress tests. We cannot judge how serious the situation is until the results are published – indeed, we shall not be able to judge even then because the report will deal only with the twenty five largest banks and the biggest problems are in the smaller banks, notably the Cajas in Spain and the Landesbanken in Germany. It is clear however that the banks need to be recapitalized on a compulsory basis. They are way over-leveraged. That ought to be the first task of the European Financial Stabilization Fund. That will go a long way to clear the air. It may be seen, for instance, that Spain does not have a fiscal crisis at all. Recent market moves point in that direction. Germany’s role may also be seen in a very different light if it becomes a bigger user than contributor of the Stabilization Fund.

Second, a tightening of fiscal policy must be offset by a loosening of monetary policy. Specifically, the ECB could buy treasury bills directly from Spain significantly reducing its financing cost below the punitive rate charged by the German inspired European Financial Stabilization Fund. But that is not possible without a change of heart by Germany.

Third, this is the time to put idle resources to work by investing in education and infrastructure. For instance, Europe needs a better gas pipeline system and the connection between Spain and France is one of the bottlenecks. The European Investment Bank ought to be able to find other investment opportunities as well.

It is impossible to be more concrete at the moment but there are grounds for optimism. When the solvency situation of the banks has been clarified and they have been properly recapitalized it should be possible to devise a growth strategy for Europe. And when the European economy has regained its balance the time will be ripe to correct the structural deficiencies of the euro. Make no mistake about it; the fact that the Maastricht criteria were so massively violated shows that the euro does have deficiencies that need to be corrected.

What is needed is a delicate, two-phase maneuver, similar to the one the authorities undertook after the failure of Lehman Brothers. First help Europe to grow its way out of its difficulties and then revise and strengthen the structure of the euro. This cannot be done without German leadership. I hope Germany will once again live up to the responsibilities that go with its leadership position. After all, it had done so in the past. Thank you.
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