We continue to view China as the biggest source of macro risk: A number of key macro indicators have improved (PMIs, macro surprises), but many others have not.

Gründe die zur Vorsicht mahnen:

1) Divergenz bei Eisenerz und neuen Aufträgen, genauso wie bei dem Wachstum von M1 relativ zu M2.

Stürzt-China-die-Weltwirtschaft-ins-Chaos-Kommentar-Simon-Hauser-GodmodeTrader.de-1
2) Rückgang der Transaktionen im Immobilienbereich

Stürzt-China-die-Weltwirtschaft-ins-Chaos-Kommentar-Simon-Hauser-GodmodeTrader.de-2
3) Die enorme Abhängigkeit der Wirtschaft von der Investitionstätigkeit.

Stürzt-China-die-Weltwirtschaft-ins-Chaos-Kommentar-Simon-Hauser-GodmodeTrader.de-3
4) Mangel an Arbeitskräften und die daraus resultierende Preissetzungsmacht von Arbeit:

The ratio of job vacancies to applicants has risen to close to an all-time high of 1.11, with our economists highlighting that the shortage of workers is concentrated among manual rather than white collar workers. This, when combined with a working age population that is now falling, suggests there are underlying upward pressures on wages.

5) Die riesige Kreditblase im Privatsektor

Stürzt-China-die-Weltwirtschaft-ins-Chaos-Kommentar-Simon-Hauser-GodmodeTrader.de-4

„China's private sector debt to GDP ratio stood at 194 % of GDP in Q1, some 30 percentage points above its 25-year trend, compared to a deviation of 15 percentage points in the US in 2008 and with BIS research suggesting that a deviation of more than 10 percentage points tends to signal an increased risk of financial trouble ahead.“

6) Eine nicht mehr wettbewerbsfähige Währung:

„We have seen signs of a slowdown in export growth and, according to BCG, China is now only 4 % cheaper as a manufacturing base than the US.

7) Steigende Zinsen im Interbankenmarkt:

„We are a little concerned that following a period of declining interbank rates, they have recently started to rise again. One-month SHIBOR has risen from a trough of 3.71 % on 3 June to 5.4 % now.“

Credit Suisse geht im Baseline-Szenario trotzdem davon aus, dass ein „Hard Landing“ aus zwei Gründen vermieden werden kann:

1) Fiskalische Flexibilität:

„Government debt to GDP is likely to be much higher than the official audited figure of 56 % of GDP, in our view. However, with nominal GDP growth still nearly double the 10-year bond yield (7 % versus 3.6 %), China is in a position to be able to afford to finance a government debt to GDP ratio of 170 %.“

2) Deposit Inflows

Stürzt-China-die-Weltwirtschaft-ins-Chaos-Kommentar-Simon-Hauser-GodmodeTrader.de-5

„While there are concerns over the shadow banking system, which now accounts for a third of total credit, the key is that 70 % of total lending occurs via the banking system. The Prime Lending rate in the banking system is still 6 % and in many instances SOEs are borrowing at 5 %. They are able to borrow at such low rates because the cost of deposits for banks is just 2 % . Currently, there is deposit growth of 10.6 % year on year despite the competition for deposits from the likes of Yue’E Bao of 5 %“

Für einen Kollaps der Wirtschaft bedarf es laut Credit Suisse zweier Voraussetzungen:

1) Sinkende Häuserpreise um mehr als 20 %. Dies würde die faulen Kredite auf 20 % hochschnellen lassen, welche dann mit 40 % der Wirtschaftsleistung nationalisiert werden müssten. Die einzige Antwort darauf wäre Geld drucken im großen Stil.
2) Deposit Outflows - wenn Kunden anfangen ihre Einlagen abziehen, müssten Banken ihre Zinsen anheben.

Beide Indikatoren sollten also engmaschig verfolgt werden.